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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 










HANSEN DAIRY, INC., et al., ) 
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JAMES M. LEVIE and ) 








STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Lessor, FMA, sued for lease payments on a corn silo 
which was never completed; Defendant Hansen Dairy Counter-
Claimed for rental already paid and Cross-Claimed against 
Levie, who was to procure and construct the silo and who 
represented FMA in obtaining the lease. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court granted judgment to Hansen Dairy against 
FMA for rentals paid, to FMA against Levie for monies advan-
ced less offsets, and against FMA for failure of consideration 
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on the lease. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FMA, solicited commercial paper from Levie--
(Mayne) a couple of different 
times as a vendor source, trying to 
drum up any business Tl61. 
Hansen contacted Levie to buy or lease a silo. Negotiat-
ions resulted in a Sales Agreement, Ex. 13, abandoned in 
favor of a lease "for smaller payments", but which requir-
ed, para. 4, completion by September 1, 1973. 
Levie contacted FMA for financing of a lease. He ex-
plained that the proposed transaction involving a used silo 
to be built at Hansen Dairy and leased to them. FMA sent 
Levie back with instructions and forms. 
No contact whatsoever was made between FMA and Hansen 
except through Levie until milk check deductions were 
stopped. T68, Tl06 L20. Levie visited many times. T68 
The documentation resulted in a lease by FMA as owner to 
Hansen as Lessee of a 36' diameter by 60' high automatic 
loadiug and unloading silo to be built by Levie. 
Unrefuted evidence shows that the transaction was con-
ditional on completion by "corn harvest time", 1973: 
Q. (To Stephen Hansen) What did you 
understand? 
A. Well, I understood we had a place 
to put our corn silage T35L29. Q. Not just the materials? 
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Q. And tell us about the time frame . 
A. The time frame was that it would be 
erected in time for the corn harvest. Q. Why? 
A. So that we could put our corn silage 
in it. T37 
Q. . What was said with respect to 
erection, delivery and erection, by 
corn harvest time? 
A. We said we would accept the silo if 
he had it erected in time for corn 
silage. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said he would have it in time. . T38. 
Q. And working? 
A. Right. 
Q. And workable? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did he say whether he could have it 
done and workable? 
A. He said he could. 
Q. Could and would? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, were there other conversations 
between you and your brothers and Levie 
with the respect to the time frame? . 
A. Well, he talked to us several times 
and each time he said he would get it 
erected. T39. 
Val Gene Hansen reiterates the same, T99 L21, adding 
that the Hansens had not the expertice, time, nor skill to 
erect the silo, would never have considered the same other 
than as fully erected, T99L9, and that the deal never changed 
along the way. T99L9. Levie confirmed this condition: 
Q. Mr. Levie . the Hansens, two of 
them at least, have said part of the 
deal was that the silo be up and work-
able by corn harvest time, 1973? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
So the lease, Ex. 1, was made for commitment fee of 
$1,497.28 and $748.64, per month for 84 months, or 
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1. The term "actual costs" means the 
cost to lessor of purchasing and deliv-
~· the above described equipmen~ 
lessee including taxes, transportation, 
installation, service of the equipment 
and other expenses. (underlining added) 
The same day, or the next, likely August 7, 1973, (Lev:.l 
would fly back and forth), Hansen executed at FMA' s request,: 
through, Levie, an Acceptance Notice. Ex. 10. In fact, 00 , I 
such Acceptance Notice, Ex. 4, with Lease, Ex. 3, was execut·l 
The duplicat·i 
partnership 
ed August 1, both with Milk Assignment, Ex. 5. 
ion of papers had only to do with corporate or 
wording. At both, or all, these times, all parties knew not·· 
ing was delivered: 
Q. Was anything there by August 7? 
The 
A. (By Stephen Hansen) No. T48L29. I' 
reason given to Hansen for the Acceptance Notice wa• 
so Levie could get an advance to expedite dismantling and 
moving from Nevada. T48; but especially to pay for feed 
wagon. T124. 
(Mrs. Levie) Especially the problem was not 
with the silo (but) the wagons . T 151; 
and on the same condition as the lease, i. e., existance of 
a silo, built and operational. Tl41. 
FMA in August 1973, at time of both first and second 
documentation, knew, and could not but have known, the silo 
to be still in Nevada: 
Q. Well at that time did he know the silo 
was still in Nevada? 
A. (By Levie) Yes . 
Q. How did he know? 
A. I told him . 
Q. That's Scott Mayne? (FMA Official) 
A. Yes. Tl26. 
4 
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Q. Are you sure you talked about going 
and tearing it down so he knew it 
was in Nevada? 
A. Yes. T136L1. 
Q. . Could he have supposed in that 
week (actually three days) you had got 
the thing built? 
A. No. T136L12. 
Q. (To Mrs. Levie) What about the silo? 
A. Well this is the next point, because 
the silo was still in Nevada it was not 
even taken down much less erected. 
Q. But was Mr. Mayne told about this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Any question in your mind? 
A. None at all. 
But that was the big thing we were talking 
about. We were talking about that we did 
know that the silo..wasn't taken down as yet. 
FMA directed Levie on both the first acceptance, T127L6; 
and on the second acceptance, T127L12, to have the same signed 
by Hansen. 
August 3, when Levie tried for an advance and was told to 
go get another set of papers, FMA manager Mr. Haws made a memo, 
Ex. 16, noting Levie would have to produce an invoice to get 
money. Told of this on his return, Levie went to a stationery 
store for an invoice form and produced one, Ex. 15, dated 
August 6. 
The next day, August 7, Levie was handed $36,000., Ex. 11. 
FMA already had, since August 3, both the August 1, lease, Ex.3, 
and August 1, Acceptance, Ex. 4, and August 1, Milk Assignment, 
Ex. 5. 
Since the office memo, Ex. 15, dated August 3, required 
but one remaining condition, an invoice, (plus corporate docu-
mentation) it is plain that the decision to release funds 
despit knowledge of the nondelivery of the silo had already 
been made, i.e., on August 3: 
5 
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Q. Then when would the conversation have 
been with Scott Mayne regarding the Accep-
tance Certificate? 
A. (By Levie) Well, it would have been on 
the 3rd. Tl99L6. 
And the Manager, Mr. Haws, was there when the check wa;, 
delivered. Tl84L25. 
FMA was solicited for feed wagon money (retail value on:\ 
$2,500. each); Tl30L23, and dismantling and transportation I 
money, but mandated payment to Levie of $36,000., their full 
cost from Levie of contructed silo: 
A. (By Mrs. Levie) And we were concerned at the 
time because we didn't want to have it all 
in one lump sum. That was not to our advan-
tage, but he said that was the way his sys-
tem worked. Tl53L6. 
A. (By Mr. Levie) Well, he said he couldn't 
disburse part of the money. They would 
have to disburse it all or not any . 
Q. You only requested part? 
A. I said we didn't need all of it, yes. 
Q. Are you saying he insisted on it, to pay 
all of the money? 
A. Well, he said that was the only way they 
could handle it. 
Q. You don't clearly know why that's so? 
A. No. Tl25. 
Attached to the lease, so conditional as well, was the 
Milk Assignment, Ex. 5, dated August 1, copies served on too 
milk buyer, Federated, August 8 and August 14. 
I 
I 
A. (By Larell Hansen) We were leasing a silo 
complete to receive corn silage and also 
the unloader in order to feed it, and if 
we didn't have it there was no reason to 
pay for it. 
The wagons were delivered. A footing trench was dug an ) 
poured, Hansen paying for the concrete, T82L4. Extent of e:-
tion appears thus: 
A. (By Stephen L. Hansen) The most that was 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. 
A. 
ever in was two rings and the roof (a 
metal cone to be hoisted). 
And the foundation? 
And the foundation. T84L30; 
and on September 7, the bottom ring only. T84L30. 
Levie fully acknowledged, T58L9, inability to deliver. 
Q. And it became, along the way, impossible 
to meet th~t time? 
A. (By Levie) That is correct . 
Q. Now, did you acknowledge that to the 
Hansens? 
A. Yes . Tl29L4. 
Q. And did you, and at one time, mention 
to them, or say to them, well then you 
will try to sell it elsewhere? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And did you try? 
A. Yes. 
Levie sold the mechanism, plus the silo, T132L28 for 
$5,000. to Farmers Grain in Fillmore. Tl31, 132. 
As to the stage of work at corn harvest time, it is note-
worthy that most of the value of the silo is in labor, the 
$36,000. Set-up less wagons, selling for only $5,000. 
There was nothing delivered when Levie was paid; a foot-
ing and one ring in September; maybe two rings at corn harvest 
time forty days later; never any mechanization, conveyors, elec-
trical, testing, etc. 
Hansen paid FMA 27 rentals of $748.62 by milk check deduct-
ions before getting same stopped, and this, because of milk 
assignment attached to the lease, and peculiar nature of limited 
market under grade "A" milk base marketing realities. R131. 
FMA then sued, tried the issues, and still today allows 
for no quarter, no error, no compromise, standing wholly on 
the printed page--as did the loaner of Venice in Shakespeare's 
play set in that city, obdurate requiring: 
I would have my bond; 
7 
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and demurs to unrefuted evidence of the corn harvest condi-
tion, as did the Venice financier when ordered to have by 
some surgeon to stop the wounds: 
I cannot find it, 'tis not in the bond. (Mer. of 
Venice IV, 1) 
In summary, and consistant with the findings, FMA solic-
ited Levie; when Levie reported a prospect FMA authored all 
documents; instructed Levie back and forth on all dealings; 
never contacted Hansen except through Levie; advanced Levie 
funds for acquistion by Levie for FMA of the silo; mandated 
payment of all, not part as requested, of funds to Levie; 
at a time FMA knew that nothing was delivered let alone con-i 
structed. Levie made the lease and accoutrements conditiona:, 
on corn harvest time delivery; was unable to so deliver; ack· 
nowledged such 
minimal at the 
! 
inability and backed away. Construction was 'I 
time; corn harvest proceeded without the silo, 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
GENERAL 
This was a lease, not a sale, nor a lease-purchase. 
Parol evidence to the contrary would be inadmissable even if 
claimed by either party, which has not been done to date. 
Kindley vs. Williams, South Dakota, 1956, 76 NW2d, 57 ALR2d 
1070. 
Bailment law is therefore applicable as to commencement 
and delivery; and ordinary contract law as to warranty, implied 
or expressed, equitable remedies, estoppel, notice, delivery, 
condition, parol evidence. 
Holder in due course principals are not involved because 
there is no assignment or sale of paper, Levie to FMA, but a 
lease, FMA to Hansen of a silo. 
of the silo. 
The only sale is Levie to FMA 
Commercial Code, Article 2, Sales Warranties do not ex-
pressly apply to leases, but by analogy have been so applied. 
48 ALR3d 660. 
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POINT I 
HANSEN IS NOT ESTOPPED BY THE "ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT". 




1. FMA procured thru Levie the 
"Acceptance Notice" for its 
own purpose in procuring silo. 
2. FMA mandated full payment to 
Levie, not an advance as 
requested. 
3. FMA's o~fice procedure allowed 
payment on receipt of invoice. 
0,' i FMA WAS NOT MISLED BY FALSE DOCUMENT IT PROCURED , 
C. FMA BOUND BY LEVIE'S ACTIONS AND REPRESENTATION. 
1. -That the Acceptance Certificate 
was to expedite, not waive, con-
struction on time. 
2. Levie, FMA's only contact with 
Hansen. 
3. FMA furnished documentation. 
4. FMA delegated Levie to negotiate. 
5. Directed Levie on each procedure. 
6. FMA relied on Levie completely. 
D. FMA'S CONDUCT ALLOWED LOSS, IF ANY, TO FMA. 
7. Unexplained refusal by FMA to pay 
advance only. 
8. No verification whatsoever with lessee. 
9. Invoice passed title, Levie to FMA, 
of parts, not of completed silo. 
10 
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A case substantially in point is American National Bank 
vs. Sommerville, 1923 California, 216 Pac. 376, holding that 
written acknowledgment of receipt of two automobiles in a con-
ditional sales contract would not estop the buyer from deny-
ing delivery of the automobiles. It held that a stipulation 
in the contract to waive the defense of failure of consideration 
may be voidable at the instance of the debtor whenever the want 
or failure of consideration in the inception and execution of 
the contract is made to appear. The contract had two provis-
ions, (1) acknowledgment of acceptance, and (2) waiver of 
defenses. The court held the clauses ineffective as against 
a showing of"a total failure of consideration, in that he had 
never received either of the two automobiles". The court also 
held there was no equitable estoppel against the buyer, be-
cause that necessitates a showing that the buyer misled by 
his declarations and conduct, the other to its prejudice, so 
that it would be a fraud on the later to allow the true state 
of facts to be proven; and that the representation must be 
one intended by the party making it to be acted upon. 
San Francisco Security Corporation vs. Phoenix Motor, 1973 
Arizona, 220 Pac. 2d 29, holds that provisions in a conditional 
sale contract making defenses based on fraud, duress, mistake, 
want of consideration, or any other ground, unavailable to 
buyer as against seller's assignee, and providing for payment 
to the assignee without recoupment, setoff, or counter-claim, 
void as against public policy and as ousting the court of 
jurisdiction. 
The lease itself, Ex. 3, para. 9, indicates it is condit-
1 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tional on delivery: 
Upon execution of this lease and the delivery 
of an item of equipment, lessee shall be ob-
ligated to preform in accordance with the terms 
hereof, including the payment of the rent pre-
scribed herein. (Underlining added.) 
Nowhere does it say the lessee shall be obligated 
whether or not there is a delivery. 
It mentions installation, para. 1, but is completely 
silent on dates of installation. 
In this case delivery without installation is meaning-
less and nowhere does the lease, even in its disclaimer claq 
attempt to negative delivery as a condition to its existenc,l 
I 
Even the "Acceptance Notice", had it been drawn true t: 
the facts, then known to FMA, would and could have said tha: 
the lessee acknowledges nonexistence and nondelivery, and no·j 
withstanding, agrees to the lease becoming effective and loci 
only to Levie for preformance and agrees to pay even if Lev:l 
should disappear. 
FMA's brief, p. 8, on the subject of Estoppel, cites 
J.P. Koch, Inc., v. J. C. Pennev, 1975 Utah, 534 Pac.2d 90. 
But the decision merely sends the case, disposed of bv 
summary judgment back for trial, the court noting, p. 904, 
that the case contains-
.dispute between parties on 
material issues upon which their 
rights depend, so there should be 
a trial 
In that case plaintiff subcontractor on Bountiful J. C 
Penney store, sued on ~echanics Lien and bond statute and 
was given summary judgment despite having equipped the gene:, 
l 2 
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contractor, Skyline, with a lien waiver, which Skyline used to 
obtain payment without paying the sub. 
In determining that the case should be tried, rather than 
summarily disposed of, the court did not decide that the sub 
should be estopped; quite the contrary, it noted, p. 904, the 
raising by the sub of several triable questions-
and-
the furnishing of the lien 
waivers was handled in a perfunctory 
manner . some of them signed with 
date and amounts left blank . 
and that under the circumstances Koch 
(the sub) should not be deemed to be 
bound thereby, nor Penney to have 
reasonably relied thereon • . ; 
• but we do not desire to be un-
derstood as indicating any opinion 
as to how the issues or facts should 
be resolved. 
The only value to us here is an enunciation, p. 905, of 
general principals of estoppel-
as applicable here the test is 
whether there is conduct by act or 
omission by which one party knowingly 
leads another reasonably acting there-
on to take some course of action which 
will result in his detriment or damage 
if the first party is permitted to re-
pudiate or deny its conduct or repre-
sentation. 
In the instant case, Hansen did not do the leading-FMA 
did so through Levie. Furthermore FMA neither relied nor 
reasonably acted upon the "Acceptance Notice", FMA fully 
knowing the silo to be "still in Nevada", T126, 152, 156, 
and mandated full payment to Levie, over Levie's protest, 
T153, as if supporting an aura of delivery and completion 
1 3 
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contrary to known fact, in order to try to justify rentals 
when there was nothing yet to rent, or to nullify a condi-
tion, that of delivery and construction, when there was ob-
viously nothing even delivered. 
It's as if partial payment, as sought by Levie, would 
give away the illusion of a res to be rented. 
14 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS FAILURE AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
A. A COMPLETE FUNCTIONAL SILO LEASED. 
--Installation was a major part. 
B. THE SILO IS WARRANTED EXPRESSLY AND 
IMPLIEDLY TO EXIST. 
--By definition. 
--By the lease. 
--The lease makes delivery and 
installation a condition. 
C. COMPLETION BY ''CORN HARVEST TIME" A 
CONDITION AND MAJOR CONSIDERATION. 
--One ring high when needed. 
D. LEVIE CONCEDED TIME REQUIREMENT COULD 
NOT BE MET. 
E. HANSEN COULD RIGHTFULLY REJECT LATE 
DELIVERY. 
F. FMA UNFAIRLY SEEKS RENTALS WHERE 
NOTHING TO RENT. 
1. Waivers of defenses are subject 
to the actual facts. 
2. Waivers are subject to ~ 
review. 
3. Court may refuse or limit 
enforcement of unconscion-
able clauses or documents. 
4. FMA ignores equitable nature 
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A land mark parol evidence and failure of consideration I 
I 
case involving conditional preformance, and in point, is Ji.i..(: 
I 
v. Bush, 1962 New York, 180 NE2d 425. 
I 
Parties contracted to merge corporate interests and tur:! 
over their stock to do so, subject, however, according to de. 
fendant, subject to the condition, orally agreed upon and 
colorfully stated, p. 228, as follows: 
I used the Chinese phrase-
'No tickie no shirtie.' 
so we will be ready. 
The court said: 
Let's get signed 
The applicable law is clear, the relevant prin-
cipals settled. Parol testimony is admissable 
to prove a condition precedent to the legal effec-
tiveness of a written agreement. 4 Williston, 
Contracts 3 ed., art. 634, p. 1021 
In short, the parties intended that their 
respective rights and duties be subject 
to two conditions acceptance of the stock 
subscription within a specified time and the 
procuring of expansion funds 
In that case lack of funds would render the dealings nu:. 
in the instant case lack of a corn silo in time for corn wou: 
render the dealings null. 
Farmers fraught by nature with all sorts of deadlines 
savvy urgency; and as with pregnancy may be unable to minimi: 
or reschedule. It is notable that FMA's surrogate, Levie, a:· 
arently of farm background and on the scene, conceded inabL: 
to meet the time frame requirement, volunteering the obvious. 
backed off, so to speak, and sold the parts elsewhere. T 11° I 
Plaintiff FMA asserts the silo was within two weeks of 
completion. That may depend on the number of workmen. 2 /]: 
alleged completion, T138, is not relistic. Compare the $5. 
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resale of components, including mechanism, T132, to 
the $36,000. (less feed wagons) cost of silo, T132. 
Whatever Levie claims, we know that the silo when 
needed was but a footing with one ring lined up. 
To his credit Levie acted realistically in conceding 
inability, at this point, while outlay was inconsequential; 
and volunteered he would sell it elsewhere, T129, and did so, 
T130, and for the account of FMA. 
The question, T138: 
Q. Did you have to have labor to 
take it down? 
should have read: 
Q. "Did you have to have labor to 
'pick it up'?" 
On parol evidence and bailment is Wines vs. Stephens, 
Utah 305. The buyer of 500 head of cattle from herds in 
Tintic and Rush Valleys, to be selected 50 at a time by the 
buyer was allowed to show by parol evidence that the seller 
had agreed orally to "gather them in", the court noting, p. 
313: 
The introduction of such evidence is no 
violation of the rule we have stated and 
no impeachment of the written contract, 
but is in furtherence of, and necessary 
to, its fair forcement . 
it relates only to the manner in 
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FMA's brief, p. 11, cites General Ins. vs. Carnicero, 
1976 Utah, 545 Pac.2d 502, dicta only, on the distinction 
between lack and failure of consideration. 
This court merely found that Judge Croft's refusal to 
allow an amendment, to show lack or failure of consideration, 
an amendment under Rule 15(b) during trial, was improper 
(bonding company had gotten extra guarantors on construction 
bond after its issuance); and the court did characterize the 
signature as "lacking in consideration", p. 505. 
In the instant case, the issue of consideration was weL 
explored and tried and the court found "failure"-or "lack" o' 
consideration adequate to nullify the lease and there is lit!l 
need here to seek characterization whether "lack" or "fai1ur' 
A more dramatic support of lack of consideration is the 
definition, Webster's Intnl. Diet. 2d p. 2338: 
Silo: usually a circular structure 
of wood, reinforced concrete, steel etc. 
for packing away fodder to convert it 
into silage 
On the "corn harvest deadline", Defendant's Brief, P· 1.1 
cites Strout Western Realty vs. Broderick, 1974 Utah, 552 h~ 
2d 144, on parol evidence. 
Plaintiff real estate broker sued to collect commission 
under an agreement; 
If a buyer of transferee, ready, willing, 
and able is procured by you or by 
anyone else including myself. p. 144. 
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Defendant succeeded by parol evidence in trial court, 
but not here, in varying the listing agreement to mean: 
To pay a commission only in case plaintiff 
sold the home. 
Such would have varied terms perfectly clear in the 
written instrument. We have no quarrel with the decision. 
The court emphasized the case to be: 
A law action to recover . p. 144. 
In the instant case we do not seek to vary the terms, but 
to invoke a condition, delivary of the goods by "corn harvest 
time". 
A necessary element of bailment is delivery. ALR 394, 
Bailment-Delivery Essential To; Ex parte Fitz, 1876, 2 Low. Dec. 
519, Fed. Cas. No. 4837. Delivery, to support a bailment re-
quires delivery according to the contract, Voland vs. Reed, 
1917 New York, 164 NY Supp. 19, holding that there was no 
delivery of a machine where essential parts were missing. 
And the burden of proof as to delivery is on the bailor, 
Bates v. Capital State Bank, 1910 Idaho, 110 Pac. 277. 
CONCLUSIONS 
FMA was bound to furnish a res in esse as a prerequisite 
to a bailment and lease and to do so in accordance with the 
"corn harvest" time condition; it was bound by its knowledge 
of non-existence at the time it paid Levie, by its own errors 
and assumption of risk in advancing funds to Levie, and by 
Levie's acknowledgment of inability to preform; by its com-
plete reliance on Levie, its holding out of Levie, its fail-
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ure to confirm anything with Hansen, and its own assumption 
of the responsibility of keeping things regular. 
Dated: February 7.~, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
l ;ft=-7~ ~~7Z:::; I 
GA YL"E DEAN HUNT 
Attorney for Defendants Responden:l 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief on 
February L~, 1980, to the following: 
Grant A. Hurst 
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist 
Attorneys at Law 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James L. Levie 
2950 North 320 ~~s~, 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
